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The changes introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon are 
particularly significant on the institutional level. The en-
tire system has, in effect, been restructured and new 
balances and inter-institutional relations are emerging 
with the effective implementation of the treaty provi-
sions and the establishment of such structures as the 
European External Action Service (EEAS).
These changes naturally affect Euro-Mediterranean 
relations on the whole and on different levels. Below 
we will examine the main changes affecting Euro-
Mediterranean relations. We will limit ourselves to 
the main political institutions, but clearly, with regard 
to the Court of Justice of the European Union, for 
instance, the impact of the Treaty of Lisbon will be 
significant, if only because the Court’s jurisdiction 
on visas, asylum and immigration have been broadly 
extended. The modifications of the Committee of the 
Regions and the Economic and Social Committee 
are likewise considerable.
the European Council: a Full-Fledged 
Institution with a new President
From the Single European Act in 1986 to the Treaty 
of Nice, the European Council has always been an 
institution that was somewhat set apart in the suc-
cessive treaties. In the framework of the Treaty of 
Nice, it did not appear under Article 7, instituting the 
European Community and enumerating the Commu-
nity’s institutions; it was the object of a specific arti-
cle of the Treaty on the European Union (Article 4).
The European Council Has Become a Full-Fledged 
Institution
In the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Council is in-
cluded in Article 13 § 1 alongside the other EU insti-
tutions. It thenceforth consists of “the Heads of 
State or Government of the Member States, togeth-
er with its President and the President of the Com-
mission,” whereas “the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy shall 
take part in its work.”1
The European Council provides the European Union 
(EU) “with the necessary impetus for its develop-
ment and shall define the general political directions 
and priorities thereof.” Moreover, it is explicitly stated 
that the European Council “shall not exercise legis-
lative functions.”2 The European Council must iden-
tify “the strategic interests and objectives of the Un-
ion.”3 It can thus make “decisions [...] on the strategic 
interests and objectives of the Union” which “shall 
relate to the common foreign and security policy and 
to other areas of the external action of the Union.” 
The problem is that the general rule that the Euro-
pean Council “shall act unanimously on a recom-
mendation from the Council”4 remains valid.
The European Council has regularly lent impetus to 
Euro-Mediterranean relations. Recall, for instance, 
the 1972 Summit of Heads of State in Paris, which 
The Lisbon Treaty and Euromed Relations
The New Architecture of the Treaty
of Lisbon: Implications for  
Euro-Mediterranean Relations
1 Article 15 § 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) / Title III: Provisions on the Institutions.
2 Article 15 § 1 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) / Title III: Provisions on the Institutions.
3 Article 22 § 1 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) / Title V: General Provisions on the Union’s External Action Service and Specific Provisions 
on the Common Foreign and Security Policy.
4 Article 22 § 1 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) / Title V: General Provisions on the Union’s External Action Service and Specific Provisions 
on the Common Foreign and Security Policy.
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launched the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP), 
the European Councils of Essen (December 1994) 
and Cannes (June 1995), which marked the estab-
lishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
(EMP) and therefore the Barcelona Process, or the 
Copenhagen European Council of December 2002, 
which launched the European Neighbourhood Poli-
cy (ENP). Its inclusion alongside the other EU insti-
tutions means that what can be called “the supreme 
political authority of the EU” will become more visible 
and this will be strengthened by the presence of a 
President that does not change every six months. 
Both on the internal and external levels, the prestige, 
visibility and thus political weight of the European 
Council is clearly strengthened.
The obstacle resides in the consensus regulation, 
which may limit the initial ambitions. In the face of 
crises such as the ones in Libya, Tunisia and Egypt, 
the sluggishness of reactions is partially due to the 
absence of consensus. Consider the interests of 
Malta and Italy with regard to the proximity of the 
Libyan crisis, or those of France in Tunisia. The main 
challenge to lend renewed “impetus” to Euro-Medi-
terranean relations and make the Mediterranean Re-
gion one of the EU’s policy “priorities” as well as one 
of its “strategic objectives” is the consensus regula-
tion. Indeed, we will often have to settle for the low-
est common denominator. A great deal thus de-
pends on the President of the European Council, 
who must play the role of facilitator in negotiations.
A “Permanent” European Council President
Elected by the European Council “for a term of two 
and a half years, renewable once,” the President of the 
European Council plays a key role, as he or she must 
“endeavour to facilitate cohesion and consensus with-
in the European Council.”5 The President likewise 
benefits from specific competences “at his [or her] 
level” (that is, on the level of Heads of State and Gov-
ernment) and “in that capacity,” ensures the external 
representation of the EU on issues concerning its 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), “with-
out prejudice to the powers of the High Representative 
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.”6
Mr. Van Rompuy participates in summits, both on the 
internal and external levels, whether they be the 
G20, the G8, the EU-United States Summit or the 
EU-Morocco Summit, the latter held on 7 March 
2010,7 to give but a few examples.8 It must be noted 
that, with the negotiation of new advanced statuses, 
other Mediterranean Partner Countries will be con-
cerned in the future.
The President of the European Council must also 
play a role at the level of multilateral Euro-Mediterra-
nean summits, but the sine die postponement of the 
second EU Summit for the Mediterranean has not 
allowed Mr. Von Rompuy to exercise in this forum. 
Since the onset of the recent crises in the Mediter-
ranean Region, he has been involved through a se-
ries of statements,9 but it is certainly within the Euro-
pean Council itself where the President can play the 
most important role, that of “consensus facilitator.”
the Council of Ministers: Configurations, 
rotating Presidencies and the High 
representative
The Council of Ministers is likewise the object of nu-
merous new provisions in the Treaty of Lisbon.
A Restructuring of Configurations within  
the Council
First of all, we should recall that the former General 
Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) 
was split into two different councils:
5 According to Article 15 § 6 of the TEU, the President of the European Council “shall chair it and drive forward its work; shall ensure the prepara-
tion and continuity of the work of the European Council in cooperation with the President of the Commission, and on the basis of the work of the 
General Affairs Council; [...]”
6 Article 15 § 6 of the TEU.
7 See the remarks by Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, at the EU-Morocco Summit in Granada on 7 March 2010, PCE 
47/10, www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/fr/ec/113201.pdf
8 See the President of the European Council’s website, www.european-council.europa.eu/the-president/summits-with-third-countries.
aspx?lang=en 
9 Cf. “Statement by Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, on the developments in the EU’s Southern neighbourhood”, Prague, 
23 February 2011, PCE 048/11, www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/119450.pdf. See also: “Declaration on 
Egypt and the Region,” European Council, 4 February 2011, PCE 027/11, www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/
ec/119143.pdf, as well as the “Statement by Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, on the Situation in Egypt”, Brussels, 29 
January 2011, PCE 020/11, www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/118993.pdf 
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• the General Affairs Council, which shall “ensure 
consistency in the work of the different Council 
configurations” and “prepare and ensure the 
follow-up to meetings of the European Council, 
in liaison with the President of the European 
Council and the Commission”; and
• the Foreign Affairs Council, which shall “elabo-
rate the Union’s external action on the basis of 
strategic guidelines laid down by the European 
Council and ensure that the Union’s action is 
consistent.”10 The latter is chaired by the High 
Representative.11
The New Rotating Presidency of the Council  
of Ministers
The matter of the new presidencies is important for 
Euro-Mediterranean issues. The Spanish and Bel-
gian presidencies found themselves in the difficult 
situation of transition from one system to another. 
The Belgian Presidency, however, despite the ab-
sence of a new federal government, was able to rely 
on a European Council President fully aware of the 
Belgian institutions.
The major difference between this and the preced-
ing system is that the country in charge of the rotat-
ing presidency of the Council gives way to the 
presidency of Ms. Ashton insofar as the foreign af-
fairs configuration.12 The system of equal rotation 
“by pre-established groups of three Member States 
for a period of 18 months” remains valid for other 
institutions, whereas the presidency of the Euro-
pean Council shall be filled by its new “permanent” 
president.13
The impact on the level of intergovernmental meet-
ings dealing with Euro-Mediterranean matters is sig-
nificant. In fact, the great majority of conclusions 
adopted on the Mediterranean Region are done so 
within the framework of the Foreign Affairs Council, 
under the leadership of Catherine Ashton. The High 
Representative thus convened an informal meeting 
of the Foreign Affairs Council for 10 March 2011 to 
discuss the issue of the Libyan crisis and the EU’s 
neighbours to the south.14
The High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy
The function of the High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy actually com-
bines a number of former functions, namely, those of 
the former High Representative, Javier Solana (with 
the exception of the position of Secretary General of 
the Council), and those held formerly by Benita Fer-
rero-Waldner as European Commissioner for Exter-
nal Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP). There is still currently a commissioner in 
charge of the ENP and Enlargement: Stefan Füle. 
The High Representative is likewise the Vice-Presi-
dent of the European Commission,15 whence the 
title of “High Representative/Vice-President” (HR/
VP), and coordinates foreign relations aspects in 
the Commission. She is thus called to work with the 
commissioners in charge of external matters. In ad-
dition, Ms. Ashton takes over the role of the Foreign 
Affairs Ministers of the former rotating presidencies 
and chairs the Foreign Affairs formation of the 
Council.16 Thus, there is no denying the position’s 
complexity and the broadness of the tasks to be 
carried out.
According to the Treaty of Lisbon, the High Repre-
sentative conducts the CFSP, contributes by her 
“proposals to the development of that policy,”17 and 
must “ensure the consistency of the Union’s external 
action.”
Within the European Commission, Ms. Ashton has 
responsibilities on the “external relations” level in 
general and on the level of “coordinating other as-
pects of the Union’s external action”18 in particular. 
This coordination function is certainly essential and 
10 Article 16 § 6 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) / Title III: Provisions on the Institutions.
11 Article 18 § 3 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) / Title III: Provisions on the Institutions.
12 Article 16 § 9 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) / Title III: Provisions on the Institutions.
13 Article 236 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. See also Council Decision 2007/5/EC, Euratom: Council Decision of 1 
January 2007 determining the order in which the office of President of the Council shall be held, OJ L 1, 04/01/2007, p. 1-11.
14 Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission, 
convened an informal extraordinary session of the Foreign Affairs Council in the form of a working breakfast to be held on Thursday, 10 March, 
European Union, Brussels, 3 March 2011, A 083/11.
15 Article 18 § 4 of the Treaty on the European Union.
16 Articles 18 § 3 and 27 § 1 of the Treaty on European Union / Titles III & V.
17 Articles 18 § 2 and 27 § 1 of the Treaty on European Union / Titles III & V.
18 Article 18 § 2 and § 4 of the Treaty on European Union / Title III.
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corresponds to the goal of greater consistency of 
the EU’s external action on the whole.
The High Representative thus  
has a preponderant role to play  
in Euro-Mediterranean relations.  
In charge of external relations  
in general and of the CFSP in 
particular, the High Representative 
is thus at the convergence of the 
EU’s different external policies
In the intergovernmental sphere, the High Repre-
sentative represents the European Union on issues 
arising from the CFSP, conducts “political dialogue 
with third parties on the Union’s behalf” and “shall 
express the Union’s position in international organi-
sations and at international conferences.”19 The im-
portance of political dialogue in the Middle East con-
flicts, an aspect that was the object of a speech by 
the High Representative,20 should also be empha-
sized, along with the High Representative’s role in-
sofar as the Quartet.21
The High Representative thus has a preponderant 
role to play in Euro-Mediterranean relations. In 
charge of external relations in general and of the 
CFSP in particular, the High Representative is thus 
at the convergence of the EU’s different external 
policies. The beginning of 2011 was marked by an 
increased presence of the High Representative on 
the Mediterranean stage.22 Ms. Ashton travelled 
namely to Egypt23, Lebanon24, Jordan25 and Tuni-
sia26 from 14 to 22 February 2011. Of course, a 
great deal will depend on the effectiveness of the 
new European External Action Service (EEAS), a 
truly hybrid institution at the heart of the new EU ex-
ternal relations system.
The European External Action Service
The European External Action Service is comprised 
by “officials from relevant departments of the Gen-
eral Secretariat of the Council and of the Commis-
sion as well as staff seconded from national diplo-
matic services of the Member States personnel.”27 It 
was the Council Decision of 26 July 2010 that es-
tablished the organisation and functioning of this 
new European body.28
Specifically, the EEAS is “a functionally autonomous 
body of the European Union.” It has “the legal ca-
pacity necessary to perform its tasks and attain its 
objectives.”29 Under the authority of the High Repre-
sentative,30 the EEAS is “made up of a central ad-
ministration and of the Union Delegations to third 
countries and to international organisations.”31
In reality, the EEAS assists the High Representative 
in conducting the CFSP and the Common Security 
19 Article 27 § 2 of the Treaty on European Union / Title V.
20 Cf. Speech by HR Catherine Ashton at the League of Arab States: “A Commitment to Peace – the European Union and the Middle East,” 
Cairo, 15 March 2010, European Union, A 36/10, www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/113352.pdf 
21 Cf. “EU High Representative Catherine Ashton chairs Middle East Quartet Ministerial meeting in Munich,” Brussels, 4 February 2011, A 044/11, 
www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/119144.pdf as well as: “Statement by the spokesperson of HR Catherine 
Ashton on the outcome of the launch of Middle East peace talks,” Brussels, 3 September 2010, A 173/10, www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/
cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/116277.pdf. See also: “EU High Representative/Vice-President Ashton to visit the Middle East in support of 
direct talks,” IP/10/1208, Brussels, 29 September 2010, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/1208&format=HTML
&aged=0&language=en&guiLanguage=en 
22 Cf. “Remarks by the EU High Representative Catherine Ashton at the Senior officials’ meeting on Egypt and Tunisia,” Brussels, 23 February 
2011, A 069/11, www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/119459.pdf 
23 “Remarks by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton at the end of her visit to Egypt,” Cairo, 22 February 2011 A 067/11, www.consilium.
europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/119445.pdf 
24 “Remarks by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton at the end of her visit to Lebanon,” Brussels, 16 February 2011, A 055/11, www.con-
silium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/119320.pdf 
25 “Remarks by the EU High Representative Catherine Ashton during her visit in Jordan,” MEMO/11/93, Brussels, 16 February 2011, http://eu-
ropa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/11/93&format=HTML&aged=0&language=en&guiLanguage=en 
26 “Remarks by the High Representative/ Vice President Catherine Ashton at the end of her visit to Tunisia,” 14 February 2011 SPEECH/11/101, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/11/101&format=HTML&aged=0&language=en&guiLanguage=en 
27 Article 27 § 3 of the Treaty on European Union / Title V.
28 Council Decision 2010/427 of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service, OJ L 201 
of 03/08/2010, p. 30-40.
29 Article 1 § 2 of Council Decision 2010/427.
30 Article 1 § 3 of Council Decision 2010/427.
31 Article 1 § 4 of Council Decision 2010/427.
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and Defence Policy (CSDP), in the Foreign Affairs 
Council and with relation to her responsibilities as 
Vice-President of the European Commission in the 
sphere of external relations.32
The EEAS has a central administration organized 
into Directorates-General (DGs).33 At the head of 
the administration is Ms. Ashton, who is assisted by 
an Executive Secretary-General, a Chief Operating 
Officer and two Secretaries-General.
A Directorate that includes North Africa, the Middle 
East, the Arabian Peninsula, Iran and Iraq particu-
larly interests the Mediterranean Region. Various 
geographic bureaus cover the following regions, 
with a quite classical breakdown:
i. The Middle East;
ii. The Arabian Peninsula, Iran and Iraq;
iii. Regional Euromed and Union for the Mediterra-
nean policies;
iv. The Maghreb.
Thematic bureaus specializing in ENP coordination 
connect this Directorate with the one covering the 
Eastern partnership and the European Union’s 
east ern neighbours, including Russia, which enjoys 
the benefits of the European Neighbourhood and 
Partnership Instrument (ENPI) but which is not part 
of the ENP as such (cf. the organization chart in 
Chart 1 above).
Finally, it must be kept in mind that the European 
Commission delegations, now “Union delegations” 
(UDs) since the entry into effect of the Treaty of 
Lisbon, are an integral part of the EEAS. In other 
words, all Mediterranean delegations, which are 
CHART 1 organization Chart of the European External action Service
MD to Europe &
Central Asia
M. Lajcák
COEST D. Johns (interim),
COWEB A. Everard,
COSCE T. Béchet
MAMA J. Gatt Rutter,
M. Bozovic, MOG S.
Kisling
Eastern Partnership,
Reg. Coop. & OSCE
Grippa
Eastern Partnership
Bilateral
Kjaer
ENP
Coordination I
Rourke
ENP
Coordination II
Majorenko
Western Europe
Grippa
Western Balkans
Jonsson
Russia
Vacant
Central Asia
Maldonado
Middle East
Uusitalo
Arabian Peninsula,
Iran & Iraq
Llombart
Regional Policies,
Euromed, UfM
Gabrici
Maghreb
Fanti
Russia, Eastern Partnership,
C. Asia, Reg. Coop. 
& OSCE
Wiegand
North Africa, Middle East,
Arabian Península,
Iran & Iraq
Vacant
Western Europe,
Western Balkans
& Turkey
Vacant
MD to North Africa, Middle East,
Arabian Península, Iran & Iraq
H. Mingarelli
Turkey Advisor
Vacant
Source: EEAS, http://eeas.europa.eu/background/docs/eeas_organisation_en.pdf, March 2011.
32 See Article 2 § 1 and following of Council Decision 2010/427.
33 See Article 4 and following of Council Decision 2010/427.
34 “The EEAS shall be made up of a central administration and of the Union Delegations to third countries and to international organisations” (Ar-
ticle 1 § 4 of Council Decision 2010/427). The “Commission and the EEAS will agree on detailed arrangements relating to the issuing of instruc-
tions from the Commission to delegations. These should provide in particular that when the Commission will issue instructions to delegations, it 
will simultaneously provide a copy thereof to the Head of Delegation and to the EEAS central administration” (Preamble, Point 13 of Council Deci-
sion 2010/427). 
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playing an increasingly important role, are hence-
forth part of the EEAS, from which they may receive 
instructions.34
the European Commission: restructuring  
of Portfolios and reorganization of the 
“rELEX Family”
With regard to the European Commission, the 
changes on the level of external relations are very 
significant due to the creation of the EEAS, which 
comprises part of the former officers of the Europe-
an Commission’s “external relations family.” In addi-
tion, recall that Ms. Ashton is also Vice-President of 
the European Commission.
Restructuring of Portfolios, Enlargement and ENP
One of the fundamental elements with regard to 
Euro-Mediterranean relations is the regrouping of 
the former “enlargement” portfolio and part of Ms. 
Ferrero-Waldner’s portfolio, i.e., the ENP portfo-
lio. Commissioner Stefan Füle is thenceforth in 
charge of both enlargement and European Neigh-
bourhood Policy. It is still too early to make an ap-
praisal but it will be interesting to examine the im-
pact of this change in the future. In any case, it is 
clear that it will be relatively subtle, Ms. Ashton 
being in regular contact with Commissioner Füle 
on matters relating to neighbourhood policy. It is 
thus rather the overall reorganization that should 
be considered.
The European Commission and Reorganization  
of the “RELEX Family”
One of the problems is that the Commission, with 
the exception of the CFSP and certain other cases, 
is to “ensure the Union’s external representation.”35 
This is not so simple when considered from the ex-
ternal perspective. Indeed, it is difficult for certain EU 
partners to find themselves between the President 
of the European Commission, the President of the 
European Council and the High Representative / 
Vice-President of the Commission.
The European Commission must in any case foster 
the general interest of the European Union and take 
the initiative, since this is its part of its mandate.36 
The creation of the EEAS does not mean that all 
competences of the EC on external affairs are trans-
ferred to it. The so-called “RELEX family,” which 
designates the Directorates-General and services of 
the Commission in charge of external relations for 
the European Commission, is being restructured. It 
currently comprises the following DGs and services: 
Development, Enlargement-ENP, Trade, Humanitar-
ian Aid and Civil Protection, and Development and 
Cooperation – EuropeAid (DEVCO). These DGs 
and services continue to be in charge of the different 
actions pertaining to them under the leadership of 
the respective commissioner, but it must be kept in 
mind that the High Representative coordinates as-
pects of the EU’s external action as a whole.
One of the fundamental 
elements with regard to  
Euro-Mediterranean relations  
is the regrouping of the former 
“enlargement” portfolio and part 
of the ENP portfolio
With regard to international agreements, it is either 
the EC or the High Representative (“where the 
agreement envisaged relates exclusively or princi-
pally to the common foreign and security policy”) 
who “shall submit recommendations to the Council, 
which shall adopt a decision authorising the opening 
of negotiations and [...] nominating the Union nego-
tiator or the head of the Union’s negotiating team.”37 
At this level as well, coordination will be essential.
Naturally, common policies such as the Common 
Trade Policy and Common Agricultural Policy, which 
are of capital importance for Euro-Mediterranean re-
lations, shall continue to be handled by the EC, and 
it is up to the latter, in conjunction with the Council 
and the High Representative, to “ensure consistency 
between the different areas of its external action and 
between these and its other policies.”38
35 Article 17 § 1 of the Treaty on European Union / Title III.
36 Article 17 § 1 of the Treaty on European Union / Title III.
37 Article 218 § 3 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
38 Article 21 § 3 of the Treaty on European Union / Title V.
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the European Parliament: Stepped Up 
Legislative and budgetary Prerogatives
The European Parliament (EP) is considered one of 
the major beneficiaries of the Treaty of Lisbon, as its 
legislative and budgetary prerogatives have been 
largely strengthened. With regard to new financial 
perspectives and the revision of the ENP, its budget-
ary powers should be taken into account. However, 
the lack of progress regarding the Parliament’s role 
insofar as CFSP is regrettable.
Legislative Powers
On the legislative level, the Treaty of Lisbon replaces 
the procedure of co-decision by ordinary legislative 
procedure, which becomes the main legislative pro-
cedure, within the framework of which the EP is con-
sidered a true co-legislator, along with the Council 
of Ministers.
The new procedure extends to some forty new are-
as, including areas relating to migratory issues or 
judicial cooperation. The EP’s approval procedure, a 
true veto power, likewise extends to new areas, as 
does the consultation procedure. The role of the Eu-
ropean Parliament is thus clearly strengthened with-
in the legislative framework. This implies the institu-
tion’s increased importance in the adoption of 
legislation regarding Euro-Mediterranean issues.
Budgetary Powers
The forthcoming financial perspective is an impor-
tant period for the EP, which has seen its powers 
stepped up in the budgetary sphere. Hence, there is 
no longer a distinction between compulsory and 
non-compulsory expenditure, which allows it to bet-
ter counterbalance the powers of the Council in this 
area. It must be emphasized that the EP also has 
rights as discharge authority with the EEAS, which 
does not, however, resolve the CFSP’s democratic 
deficit.
External Relations Powers
With regard to issues relating to the former first pillar 
(European Communities) of the Treaty of Nice, the 
powers of the EP are strengthened thanks to the ex-
tension of powers and prerogatives of the Parlia-
mentary Assembly in the above-stated legislative 
and budgetary areas.
The European Parliament (EP) 
is considered one of the major 
beneficiaries of the Treaty of 
Lisbon, as its legislative and 
budgetary prerogatives have been 
largely strengthened. However, 
the lack of progress regarding the 
Parliament’s role insofar as CFSP 
is regrettable
With regard to the CFSP and the CSDP, however, 
the EP’s powers remain very limited. Indeed, the 
Treaty of Lisbon establishes that the High Repre-
sentative “shall regularly consult the European Par-
liament on the main aspects and the basic choices 
of the common foreign and security policy and the 
common security and defence policy and inform it 
of how those policies evolve.” Although the EP can 
“ask questions of the Council or make recommen-
dations to it and to the High Representative” and, 
twice a year, holds “a debate on progress in imple-
menting the [CFSP],” 39 there is no denying that the 
EU still has a significant democratic deficit in spe-
cific areas of security and defence. This is all the 
more problematic since the Court of Justice has no 
competence in these matters, with a few, scant ex-
ceptions.40
Conclusions
Understanding the new institutional system is not 
easy, all the more so because we are still in a learn-
ing stage. When the EEAS is launched, things 
should move faster and one can expect the estab-
lishment of a new dynamic in the medium term.
Generally speaking, it can be considered that the 
Treaty of Lisbon is strongly marked by intergovern-
39 Article 36 of the Treaty of Lisbon.
40 Cf. Article 24 § 1 of the Treaty on European Union / Title V.
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mentalism. Indeed, either new, mixed structures with 
a great intergovernmental predominance such as 
EEAS have been created, or intergovernmental insti-
tutions have been strengthened, as in the case of 
the European Council. There are a slew of other ex-
amples, as, for instance, the strengthened Peters-
berg Tasks, the European Defence Agency or struc-
tured cooperation.
The Treaty of Lisbon is strongly 
marked by intergovernmentalism. 
Indeed, either new, mixed 
structures with a great 
intergovernmental predominance 
such as EEAS have been created, 
or intergovernmental institutions 
have been strengthened, as in the 
case of the European Council
It must be emphasized that, though the pillar struc-
ture of the European Union was abolished, a sort of 
hidden pillar remains. Indeed, Chapter 2 of the Trea-
ty on European Union’s Title V41 is entitled “Specific 
Provisions on the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy Dispositions.” The Treaty clearly stipulates 
that the CFSP is subject to “specific rules and pro-
cedures” and that it is subject to the general rule of 
unanimity. Moreover, “the adoption of legislative acts 
shall be excluded” and “the common foreign and se-
curity policy shall be put into effect by the High Rep-
resentative […]”.42 In other words, there has been no 
communitarisation of the CFSP – far from it, in fact. 
Though the European Commission keeps significant 
prerogatives in external relations, the creation of a 
hybrid EEAS, that is, one composed of different 
types of officials, radically changes the situation. On 
the supranational level, it is clearly the European 
Parliament that enjoys the greatest progress; but 
only a priori, since the Parliamentary Assembly must 
yet provide itself with the means for its ambitions.
Insofar as Mediterranean affairs, it is clear that these 
changes will have a significant impact. The actors 
are multiplied, and this, unfortunately, is not a sign of 
efficiency. Many things will depend on the efficiency 
of the new EEAS. Inter-institutional and personal re-
lations between the High Representative, the Presi-
dents of the Commission and the European Council 
and Commissioner Füle are crucial for the Mediter-
ranean facet of the EU’s external relations.
Today, with the challenges of the political transitions 
underway and the crises in the Mediterranean Re-
gion, the European Union under the Treaty of Lisbon 
has new tools that it should use with the greatest 
consistency possible, and this is one of tasks of the 
High Representative. A consensus must above all 
be reached between the 27 Member States within 
the European Council under the impetus of its pres-
ident, and the EU must be capable of quickly mobi-
lizing funds for emergency humanitarian aid while 
investing in the long term in transition processes that 
could radically change the order in the Mediterrane-
an Region.
41 Treaty on European Union / Title V: General Provisions on the Union’s External Action Service and Specific Provisions on the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy.
42 Article 24 § 1 of the Treaty on European Union / Title V.
